A supplement to the book Maritime Sniper Manual: Precision Fire from Seaborne Platforms.

by Fredrik C. Jonsson

Piracy has existed for as long as there has been waterborne traffic, and it will continue to exist as long as the payoffs trump the risks involved.

Every country today depends on import and export for its subsistence or economic livelihood, and seaborne transportation is still by far the most economical way to transport goods around the globe. Oceangoing vessels transport more than 90 percent of global trade, and, at any one time, more than 45,000 merchant ships sail the seas, manned by 1.25 million seafarers. Without international shipping, half the world would freeze and the other half would starve, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). If pirates or terrorists are allowed to hijack or interrupt this traffic, it will have a tremendous impact on the global economy and, consequently, on citizens around the world.

Please note that Modern Piracy and Maritime Terrorism reflects my personal views on the topic and is based mainly on my (and colleagues’) experiences from operations in Somalia and other affected areas.

Pirates holding the FV Tian Yu and its crew hostage. (Photo: U.S. Navy.)

DEFINITIONS

According to Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy is defined as:

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

Neither the United Nations nor the international community has yet been able to define “terrorism” because it is such a politically and emotionally charged term. According to United States law (U.S. Code Title 22, Ch. 38, Para. 2656f (d)), terrorism is defined in this way:

(d) Definitions

As used in this section—

(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;

(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents;

(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism;

(4) the terms “territory” and “territory of the country” mean the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and

(5) the terms “terrorist sanctuary” and “sanctuary” mean an area in the territory of the country—

(A) that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization—

(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, and recruitment; or

(ii) as a transit point; and

(B) the government of which expressly consents to, or with knowledge, allows, tolerates, or disregards such use of its territory and is not subject to a determination under—

GEOGRAPHICAL TROUBLE SPOTS

Piracy today mainly takes place in the following areas:

• The Gulf of Aden, near Somalia and the southern entrance to the Red Sea
• The Gulf of Guinea, near Nigeria and the Niger River delta
• The Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia
• The waters off the Indian subcontinent, particularly between India and Sri Lanka

Actually, the entire Indian Ocean should be listed as one gigantic trouble spot, as attacks occur frequently there and are not limited to coastal areas.

Mariners are warned to be extra cautious and to take necessary precautions when transiting waters near the following countries:

• Bangladesh
• Brazil
• Cameroon
• Colombia
• Costa Rica
• Djibouti
• Ecuador
• Eritrea
• Guinea
• Haiti
• India
• Indonesia
• Kenya
• Madagascar
• Malaysia
• Maldives
• Nigeria
• Oman
• Peru
• Seychelles
• Somalia
• Tanzania
• Venezuela
• Vietnam
• Yemen

As an example, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and Maritime Security Centre—Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)—recommend that vessels not making scheduled calls to ports in Somalia should keep as far away as possible from the Somali coast, preferably more than 600 nautical miles from the coastline. Known pirate strongholds in Somalia include Harardhere, Eyl, Hobyo, and coastal areas in the vicinity of Boosaaso.

Piracy is not limited to the identified hot spots. In 2009, the Malta-registered merchant vessel Arctic Sea was hijacked off the coast of Sweden, en route from Finland to Algeria. After the hijacking, the vessel disappeared and was not found until three weeks later, when it was boarded by the Russian navy at Cape Verde. The circumstances regarding this event are still somewhat mysterious.

PIRACY STATISTICS

According to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, maritime piracy reached its highest levels in 2009, with 406 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea (153 boarded vessels, 49 hijacked vessels, 84 attempted attacks, and 120 vessels fired upon). A total of 1,052 crewmen were taken hostage, 68 were injured, and 8 were killed in the various incidents.

Of these 406 reported incidents, Somali pirates accounted for 217, hijacking 47 vessels and taking 867 crewmembers hostage. Although the number of incidents off Somalia in 2009 almost doubled compared to the number in 2008, the number of successful hijackings was proportionately less. This decrease can be attributed to the increased presence of naval ships in the area and the fact that more experienced and skilled pirates had either “retired” (due to successful enterprises) or been caught, which meant more inexperienced individuals were testing their luck on the seas. Another reason was heightened awareness on commercial vessels, resulting in more effective preclusive actions by shipping companies and their crews.

Many reported attacks from countries surrounding Somalia are actually carried out by Somali pirates and not by pirates from the affected country itself. This is the case for such countries as Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti, and the Seychelles.

Suspected Somali pirates. (Photo: U.S. Navy.)

During 2009, 28 incidents were reported off the coast of Nigeria—21 vessels were boarded, three vessels were fired upon, one vessel was hijacked, and three masters (i.e., merchant ship commanders) reported an attempted attack on their vessels. Targeted vessels included general cargo ships, bulk carriers, reefers, and all types of tankers. It is believed that the number of unrecorded cases in this area is extensive. The Nigerian attacks are statistically much more violent in nature compared to other areas, including Somalia. One crew was reportedly killed as the robbers tried to escape after looting the vessel.

Indonesia reported 15 incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in 2009. Only two incidents were reported in the Strait of Malacca, but for the second year in a row, incidents in the Singapore Straits had increased. Nine incidents were reported in 2009 (six vessels boarded and three attempts), compared to six in 2008.

Thirteen incidents were reported in the South China Sea—11 vessels boarded, one vessel hijacked, and one attempted attack. This was the highest number of incidents in the region in the previous five years.

Bangladesh showed a slight increase in the number of attacks compared to those in 2008. Of the 17 vessels attacked, 14 were boarded. A majority of the incidents took place within the Chittagong anchorage.

Thirty-seven incidents were reported from countries in the South American theater in 2009, compared to 14 in 2008. Twelve incidents occurred in the anchorage of Callao, Peru, compared to five in 2008. A number of pirate attacks were also reported from Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, and Venezuela. The majority of these attacks were successful and were carried out while the vessels were berthed in port or while at anchor.

Statistics for 2010 show that the total number of attacks declined somewhat, thanks to the joint international military effort to combat piracy. Extensive air surveillance from fixed-wing, helicopter, and satellite assets played a big part in these operations. However, the number of attacks stopped by military force (i.e., disruptions) actually increased substantially in 2010.

Air assets played a vital role in the successful outcome of the Maersk Alabama incident in April 2009. Above, an aerial image of the lifeboat on which Captain Richard Phillips was held hostage; below, an image of the Maersk Alabama. (Photos: U.S. Navy.)

WHY PIRACY IN THE 21st CENTURY?

Generally, piracy still exists in some areas in the 21st century due to common poverty. Lack of social welfare programs in developing regions, close proximity to large sea trade routes, and a nonexistent (or very ineffective) navy or coast guard combine to create a fertile environment for pirate recruitment and activity. There is, of course, more to it, and every area affected by piracy has its unique background and explanations.

In Somalia, for example, the rise of modern piracy was mainly triggered by large foreign fishing companies that overfished and depleted the once-rich waters off the coast during the 1980s and 1990s. Another contributing factor was European companies dumping toxic and radioactive waste, both inland and in the sea, which also caused the fish population to decline. Because of these factors, many fishermen lost their means of livelihood and could no longer provide for their families. Some, though not all, began boarding foreign fishing vessels to claim payment as some kind of a fine. At first, these acts of retribution turned the fishermen into heroes in the eyes of the local population, but piracy proved to be quite lucrative, and the business expanded to hijacking and taking hostages. Soon out-of-work military and militia members from the numerous civil wars of Somalia began to join the fishermen in the acts of piracy.

In other poverty-stricken areas of the world, it is just too tempting to watch the huge moneymakers sail by while your family starves without taking your chances. The great majority of modern pirates, however, are plain and simple criminals or mercenaries, corrupted by the promise of profit for the act.

Fame is another factor that motivates individuals to become pirates, just as it was hundreds of years ago. Some consider it better to be notorious than unknown. A modern Somali pirate captain can retire after a couple of successful hijackings and adopt a new lifestyle, with luxury cars and houses, trophy wives, and the ability to provide for his family and relatives for the rest of his life. In Somalia, there are actually new upscale residential areas inhabited solely by successful pirates. These captains become famous, almost like movie stars, and are idolized by many youths, which makes the recruiting process for other pirates quite easy. Many individuals, even from inland areas, are lured to pirate strongholds by the dream of economic independence and stardom, in contrast to poverty, starvation, and obscurity.

One can argue about the wisdom of shipping and insurance companies granting the ransom demands of pirates time after time. Does it not encourage new hijackings and attacks? Well, yes, it probably does, but it is often more economical to pay the ransom (which is often reduced by negotiation) than having the ship, its crew, and its valuable cargo seized indefinitely. The cost of having a major merchant vessel seized or hijacked is about $35,000 a day, whereas the ransom for such a ship would be approximately $2 to $4 million after negotiations. There have, however, been incidents of ransoms as high as $10 million.

Ransom being dropped by parachute to the hijackers of the Sirius Star. (Photo: U.S. Navy.)

An alternative is to organize a hostage-rescue and vessel-recapture operation without cooperation of the local authorities (because many times they are quite corrupt and not trustworthy), but this would probably be a lot more expensive, both in money and lives. Things get even more complicated because there are several stakeholders involved in a merchant vessel, including the owner of the ship, the owner of the cargo, and the recipient of the cargo. Rather than try to coordinate the interests of all these parties, it is often more convenient to just pay the ransom and look at it as an acceptable expenditure.

How about selecting another route for merchant vessels that allows them to avoid pirate-prone areas? Again, it is more economical to pay an occasional ransom than to take such alternate routes. In the case of Gulf of Aden, you would have to round the southern tip of Africa, which adds three weeks to the journey, and time is big money in this business. It is true that the more ships that are hijacked, the higher insurance premiums will be to cover the losses for the insurance companies, and the shipping companies will have to raise the price for transporting cargo. But none of those increased expenses offset the financial advantages of taking the shortest, quickest route possible to the destination port.

Piracy is a lucrative business not only for the pirates. Other individuals use their positions to cash in on this phenomenon, including crooked lawyers, greedy businessmen, and corrupt officials. Many pirate strongholds have actually organized a type of pirate stock exchange. At these establishments, one can invest in a pirate venture with either money or equipment (e.g., supplies, weapons, fuel, vessels, engines, GPS devices, cell and satellite phones). If the venture is successful, the investor will get his share of the profit based on how much he invested.

In northern Somalia, piracy is often combined with human trafficking, a traditionally big business in that part of the country. Refugees are smuggled from Somalia across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen for approximately $100 a head. The return trip, however, is quite uneconomical considering the fuel consumption. An effective way to make the return trip worthwhile is to snatch a merchant vessel on the way back, deliver it to the guard detail, have the negotiators contact the shipping company (for an established percentage of the ransom), and wait for the money to arrive. (See below for more on guard details, negotiators, and other human elements of a pirate operation.)

Vessels used in human trafficking: whaler (top) and skiff (bottom).

PIRATE ORGANIZATION

The composition of a pirate crew naturally will differ from incident to incident, but it is possible to identify some common similarities. A standard crew consists of about four to six persons per skiff (small boat), and one to three skiffs are usually involved in the actual attack (not counting the mother ship). The crew aboard each boat is organized to handle different responsibilities. The general roles include:

• “Shooters”—Former military or militia, in charge of the boarding and hijacking part.
• Navigators—Usually fishermen, responsible for directing and driving the boat.
• Technicians/engineers—Responsible for engine maintenance, GPS and satellite phone operation, etc.
• Servants/apprentices—Often youths or rookies, responsible for cooking, cleaning, and attending the elders.

Typical pirate skiffs.

A strict hierarchy exists aboard a pirate vessel, from the captain, who is the most experienced and has the highest number of successful attacks to his credit, down to the inexperienced youths/rookies. The captain usually tries to minimize the number of the crew, as more people equal a lower percentage of the ransom.

In addition to the pirate crew, there is also a guard detail consisting of inexperienced youths/rookies, who are responsible for guarding the hijacked ship and its crew once it is anchored at some secluded location. You also have the businessmen and lawyers responsible for funding the venture and handling the ransom negotiations. All these call for a large, well-organized structure, and major criminal gangs or militias most often supervise or run pirate operations. In many developing nations, these gangs and militia have connections with the ruling class, and it is quite safe to assume that a percentage of the ransom money will end up in the pockets of high-ranking officials.

In Somalia, society is totally regimented by the clan structure, which is the single most important and dominating factor within (and outside) the country. Interestingly, clan structure has a relatively subordinated role within many Somali pirate groups, in contrast to the rest of Somali society. A pirate crew can be made up of individuals from different and even rival clans—what is important is the experience, skills, and specialties of each member. The profits tend to make everyone involved rather pragmatic, overruling such standard norms as religion and clan structure.

PIRATE TACTICS

Standard operating procedures for most pirate groups go something like this. Crews leave their strongholds or hiding places (e.g., caves) early in the morning (under the cover of darkness), place themselves in the middle of the trade route/transit corridor, and wait for a suitable target (i.e., slow vessels with low freeboard, that lack security details, and that have a minimum of preventive measures in place). The target is most often some kind of tanker or merchant vessel, but there have been numerous reports of fishing boats, yachts, and even sailing boats being hijacked.

A secluded pirate village.

When the target is identified, the next step is to board the ship with the help of makeshift boarding ladders. It is easier to board a ship that is dead in the water, so the pirates will try to stop it by firing warning shots, followed by shots to the bridge if necessary. Such hostile fire can include both small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). If the ship fails to comply, and as long as any countermeasures are not too aggressive, the pirates will most likely try to board anyway, which involves a greater risk of drowning and might affect how the crew is treated once taken hostage. After the ship has been boarded and the bridge seized, the crew will be locked up, with the exception of a few crewmembers needed to sail the vessel to a secure location.

The increased presence of naval vessels in troubled waters has forced pirates to change their modus operandi. The use of a mother ship as an operational hub has grown quite popular and enables the pirates to reach new, unprotected areas. With a mother ship, pirates can now access such locations as the Seychelles, Madagascar, and the Maldives, increasing their reach to almost 1,000 miles off the coast. The mother ship is often a hijacked vessel itself in the form of a large fishing boat, yacht, smaller merchant vessel, dhow (small local freighter) or whaler (somewhat larger than a skiff but smaller than a dhow). The smaller skiffs used for boarding are kept on deck or towed.

Two examples of dhows—small, local freighters sometimes used as mother ships for pirate operations.

In some cases, Yemeni fishing boats have been hijacked and used as mother ships, and unofficial sources say that, in a few of these cases, the regular crew has been killed and thrown overboard. This would indicate a changing trend, as such violence has usually been kept to a minimum. It could, however, indicate that pirates are more willing to injure and kill individuals from their own geographical theater than foreigners.

Pirates have also learned that it can be advantageous to use the hijacked ship as the mother ship. There have been situations where the hijacked ship, with hostages still aboard, has been able to move freely through the whole Gulf of Aden, shadowed by several naval vessels, which are incapable of intervening. Even if the naval forces wanted to board the hijacked ship, they could not because they lack both a mandate and adequate rules of engagements (and, in some cases, skills). One should also remember that a hostage-rescue operation on the high seas is extremely complex, and the success rate is rather low.

HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATIONS: THE SUCCESSES There have been a number of successful maritime hostage rescue operations (as well as some fatal ones, unfortunately). The rescue of Richard Phillips, captain of the merchant vessel Maersk Alabama, by the U.S. Navy in April 2009 is a fantastic example. The circumstances were quite odd, as Captain Phillips and his captors were located in a lifeboat, towed approximately 25 yards astern by the USS Bainbridge. Another example is the recapture from Somali pirates of the hijacked German container ship Taipan in April 2010. Conducted by the Unit Interventie Mariniers (UIM) of the Dutch Marine Corps Maritime Special Operation Forces (MARSOF), the operation was feasible due to the fact that the entire crew had managed to lock themselves in a secure compartment (safe room) and, by doing so, denying the pirates the tactical advantage of having hostages. A third example is the September 2008 rescue of a French couple, who were being held hostage aboard their sailboat by Somali pirates. Thirty operators from the French unit Commando Hubert air-dropped a distance away from the Carre D’as IV, swam to the yacht, and killed one pirate and captured another six. In contrast to these successful operations, there have also been incidents of countries claiming to have rescued hostages, while inside sources state that a ransom was delivered and the “rescue operation” was simply propaganda to save face.

Other tactics pirates employ around the world include faking a distress situation to get the targeted vessel to stop or at least slow down, hiding among clusters of fishing boats and suddenly attacking, boarding and attacking ships at anchor, and using the limits of territorial waters (and the legal and diplomatic difficulties involved) as a mean of losing pursuing forces.

The “standard” pirate armament often consists of AKMs (Kalashnikov automatic rifles) or other assault rifles, machine guns, RPG launchers, pistols, and machetes. Firearms are often in rather poor condition, with some weapons not working at all, and the operator’s level of training can vary widely. Other specific pirate equipment includes makeshift boarding ladders, GPS devices, cell/satellite phones as comms, and multiple plastic fuel cans (to maximize vessel endurance). The vessels are often small but fast, with powerful twin engines (in order to intercept target vessels and evade/escape naval forces) and occasionally painted in murky colors to help them blend in better with the water.

A Yemeni skiff equipped for piracy. Note the powerful twin engines,
boarding ladders, and extra plastic fuel cans to extend the vessel’s time and range at sea.

Confiscated assault rifles and boarding ladders.

Considering the typical size of pirate attack boats and the hazardous procedure of boarding another vessel with makeshift ladders, it is safe to state that today’s pirates do not have “bad-weather capability.” The monsoon seasons, for example, involve high waves, and high waves often mean no or very low pirate activity.

HOW TO COMBAT PIRACY

Modern piracy could probably be combated and conquered by maritime forces alone (e.g., by escorting merchant vessels, patrolling pirate-prone areas, blockading strongholds, etc.), but this would require vast numbers of naval vessels over a long period. It would not be economically feasible, and it would require enough personnel that the crews could be cycled to avoid wearing out the human resources. Another approach would be to combine maritime forces with ground forces. This strategy would solve the problem quite fast, but it would also pose a greater risk of casualties. Naval presence alone, at best, prevents attacks but does not decrease the number of pirates, and the pirates soon develop new modus operandi, prowl new geographical areas, and take greater risks to achieve their goals. This results in an increased naval presence, and we have a classic vicious cycle.

 

An apprehended pirate skiff.

A major issue for all countries with a naval presence in pirate-prone areas is what to do with apprehended suspects. If the nation of origin has a functional justice system, turning over the suspects to the local authorities solves the problem rather easily. The tricky part can be the ensuing legal process. How has the evidence been collected and kept? Would people involved in the apprehension be summoned to testify? If there is no working legal system, the suspect must be brought either to the country of the captors (where he might seek asylum) to stand trial, or to a nearby nation that has agreed to take legal proceedings against pirates.

As a result, many navies do not apprehend suspected pirates, because the bureaucratic process is too demanding. Instead, they seize equipment and weapons and set the suspects with enough fuel to make it back to the coast. This is a shortsighted solution—there is absolutely no shortage of replacement weapons in pirate-prone areas, it is quite easy to reacquire things like GPS devices or cell/satellite phones, and the number of pirates will continue to increase. (Think about it: How discouraging is it to lose some common equipment, when economic independence is within reach?) Besides, it is unusual to find any weapons or incriminating equipment aboard a seized vessel, as the standard operating procedure among pirates is to dump such things overboard when approached by naval vessels.

 

U.S. naval forces apprehend pirate suspects. (Photo: U.S. Navy.)

Another possible solution is economic sanctions, but sanctions require a somewhat intact government structure in the country of origin. Otherwise, they only affect ordinary citizens in those countries. That might have a totally opposite effect: the cultivation of a new, even larger crop of pirates.

Almost every shipping company has some sort of nonviolence policy, meaning that crewmembers are under orders to not use violence to protect their vessels. This policy is based on the belief that if crews used weapons and more aggressive countermeasures (like ramming the small pirate vessels), it would escalate the situation and might result in a higher number of injured crewmembers, as well as endanger the valuable ship and/or its cargo. Another factor in company nonviolence policies is the fact that merchant ships with arms onboard would face tremendous legal hassles whenever they tried to dock in ports of different countries, each with different laws about weapon possession aboard vessels.

Many shipping companies do, however, allow more passive methods to evade pirate attacks, such as high-speed and evasive maneuvers, hosing attacking vessels with water from high-pressure firefighting pumps, using water cannons specifically designed as nonlethal weapons, and emplacing barbed wire or electric fencing around the sides of the vessel. Today, many vessels contain a “safe room,” an impenetrable area, offering ballistic protection, with supplies and comms for the crew to take cover in during an attack. This feature greatly increases the success rate of a hostages-rescue operation. Many shipping companies also install sophisticated sensors to detect threats as early as possible to avoid suspect vessels. There are also Internet pages that allow individual ships to warn others about attacks and suspicious vessels. If one wants to maximize the chances of not getting hijacked or boarded, the solution is to have the crew properly trained in piracy countermeasures and response by experienced instructors, and to maintain a security detail aboard composed of professional operators.

 

Two examples of nonviolent preventive actions to thwart pirate boardings: barbed wire placed around the sides of the vessel,
and high-pressure water pumps to keep boarding vessels at bay.

It is important to point out that today’s pirates are not religious fanatics or terrorists but rather ordinary criminals. They are driven by the prospect of profit and have no intention of getting hurt or killed in the process, even if they are prepared to take some calculated risks to achieve their goal. If confronted by a superior force, they will eventually surrender if they believe there is no way to escape unharmed.

DEVELOPMENT Recent information has shown a number of clashes, in some cases full-blown combat actions, between Islamic militias and pirates. Many Islamic groups consider the pirates in violation of the laws of Islam (Sharia) and have taken it upon themselves to fight this abomination. This is the case in Harardhere, Somalia, where Hizbul Islam, an Islamic militia, fought and drove out the local pirates. There have also been several cases of villagers in the coastal regions of Somalia rising against the local pirates and forcing them to relocate. The reason for this hostility is mainly inflation—the price of fish and rice has risen significantly in areas already suffering from poverty and starvation. This phenomenon develops when successful pirates start to flood the village with ransom money, and the local merchants and businessmen try to get a bigger share of the loot by raising prices, which escalates the inflation and makes the situation for the common man even more desperate. It is too early to draw any conclusions from these clashes, but it could signal that religious groups and ordinary citizens are becoming fed up with the pirates and, in the absence of an organized and effective law enforcement agency in the country, are starting to take matters into their own hands.

MARITIME TERRORISM

At first glance, it is easy to assume that the majority of the world is spared from maritime terrorism. The truth is quite the opposite: terrorism is a substantial threat to the entire maritime arena. Intelligence agencies have made considerable efforts to investigate connections between pirate groups and terrorist organizations. For the time being, there has been no evidence (at least nothing declassified) of any links, but things have a way of changing quickly in these parts of the world.

That said, ransom money may very well make its way to terrorist organizations under the radar of the intelligence agencies. Another potential scenario is where terrorist or religious extremist organizations put the pirates out of play, as is already happening in some parts of Somali, and ultimately take over the lucrative operations. The line between terrorist and criminal organizations can sometimes be very thin and, whatever the goals of each might be, they both need vast incomes to fund their operations. They also thrive in the absence of a functional and effective government, and they require a solid recruitment pool. All these factors are present in pirate-prone areas, and therefore, if it’s not happening already, there will most likely be greater maritime activity from terrorist organizations in those regions.

A review of major incidents of maritime terrorist attacks between 1971 and 2010 shows the longevity and depth of the problem:

Achille Lauro
On 7 October 1985, Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro in Egyptian waters, on its way from Alexandria to Port Said. The terrorists sailed the ship to Syria while holding the crew and passengers hostage, and demanded the release of 50 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. The hijackers killed a passenger and threw him overboard when the vessel was refused permission to dock at Tartus, Syria. The ship then sailed back to Port Said, and after two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered in exchange for safe passage to Tunisia. Once the murder was discovered, U.S. Navy aircraft intercepted the airliner carrying the terrorists and forced it to land in Sicily, where Italian authorities apprehended the suspects.

City of Poros
On 11 July 1988, by Palestinian terrorists attacked the passenger ferry City of Poros three miles off Aegina, Greece. The terrorists, from the Abu Nidal Organization, gained access to the ship by posing as passengers. They killed nine tourists and injured 98 with automatic rifles and hand grenades and then escaped from the ship after being collected by a speedboat.

USS The Sullivans
On 3 January 2000, members of al-Qaeda attempted an attack on the USS The Sullivans, a guided-missile destroyer, while in port at Aden, Yemen. The plan was to detonate a small boat carrying vast quantities of explosives near the destroyer. The operation failed because the boat was so overloaded that it sank, forcing the attack to be abandoned.

USS Cole
On 12 October 2000, al-Qaeda suicide bombers attacked the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole while in port at Aden, Yemen. A small boat carrying more than 1,000 pounds of explosives was detonated close to the U.S. Navy ship. The explosion created a hole in the port side about 40 feet (12 meters) in diameter, killing 17 crewmembers and injuring 39.

Limburg
On 6 October 2002, the oil tanker Limburg was in the Gulf of Aden, on its way from Iran to Malaysia, when a small boat carrying explosive charges rammed it. The explosion killed one crewmember and injured 12, and vast quantities of oil leaked into the ocean. Al-Qaeda is believed to be responsible for the attack.

SuperFerry 14
On 27 February 2004, the passenger ferry SuperFerry 14 sunk in Manila Bay due to the damage caused by a bomb planted by the Abu Sayyaf, an Islamist separatist group. Of the 899 passengers on board, 116 were reported killed in the incident.

Ahi Hanit
On 14 July 2006, a missile hit the Israeli Navy corvette Ahi Hanit in Lebanese waters, resulting in major damage to the ship. Hezbollah fired the shore-to-ship missile, which killed four crew members. This is just one example of many maritime attacks carried out by Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestine Liberation Front, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command. Maritime terrorist operations executed by these organizations have included suicide attacks, the use of mines and explosives against ships and port facilities, stealth approaches by underwater demolition teams, raids against onshore targets (launched from mother ships), and missile and rocket attacks. These incidents have claimed numerous victims, both military and civilian.

M. Star
On 27 July 2010, the oil tanker M. Star suffered hull damage caused by an explosion in Omani waters. One crewmember was injured, but there was no oil leakage. It is believed that a suicide bomber in a speedboat conducted the attack, as radar had picked up a small vessel near the oil tanker just before the explosion. Further investigations also revealed traces of explosives on the hull.

Islamist terrorist groups are not the only perpetrators of maritime terrorism. Consider the activities of two well-known secular terrorist groups:

Provisional Irish Republican Army
Between 1971 and 1990, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) attacked a total of nine vessels (both civilian and military). The attacks resulted in eight vessels sunk and one substantially damaged (the RFA Fort Victoria). Further, on 27 August 1979, PIRA terrorists assassinated Lord Mountbatten (admiral of the fleet and member of the House of Lords) by detonating a radio-controlled explosive device hidden aboard the Lord’s fishing boat. The explosion killed Lord Mountbatten, two relatives, and a crewmember. The PIRA also tried to harass the maritime traffic into and out of Londonderry port, and it has been reported that the group tried to damage a naval vessel with a .50-caliber sniper rifle.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a Sri Lankan terrorist organization whose agenda was to create a sovereign Tamil state. The LTTE armed campaign began in 1983 and ended in 2009, when the group was defeated by Sri Lankan armed forces. According to Sri Lankan officials, between 1990 and 2008, the maritime wing of the LTTE, known as the Sea Tigers, conducted 24 attacks on vessels and port facilities, the majority as suicide attacks with waterborne improvised explosives. The attacks resulted in the death of 270 civilians and members of the armed forces, as well as 20 sunk or damaged naval and civilian vessels. During the LTTE campaign, regular sea battles were actually fought between the Sri Lankan navy and the LTTE, with up to 20 Sea Tiger vessels involved at a time, which shows the strength of the LTTE and its maritime wing.

The maritime arena offers a lot of potential targets for a terrorist strike, but people often naively feel protected by the water and do not consider it to be a possible killing ground for terrorists. The list of potential maritime targets is extensive and includes high-value/high-risk units like oil and gas platforms (GOPLATs); refineries; port facilities; tankers containing crude oil, gas/liquefied natural gas, or chemical compounds; and vessels freighting nuclear waste, weapons, or explosive and combustible agents. These objects could easily be damaged or destroyed by waterborne improvised explosive devices (IEDs), RPG launchers, or big-bore sniper rifles with incendiary high-explosive or armor-piercing incendiary ammunition, and the consequences would be catastrophic on humans and the environment. Other threats could involve the use of mines, missiles, rockets, divers, and even midget submarines. Vessels could also be hijacked or covertly rigged with explosive devices (e.g., hidden in shipping containers/cargo, which makes it hard to inspect due to bureaucratic issues, or implanted anywhere aboard the vessel or under the waterline) to create a vast waterborne IED or even a so-called dirty bomb (radioactive material combined with conventional explosives). If allowed to dock at a port facility or near a GOPLAT without suspicion, it would cause major havoc upon detonation. As history has taught us, terrorist targets do not have to be military or high-value/high-risk units; they can also incorporate passenger ferries, cruise ships, and private yachts. It is also possible to scuttle a large ship in a narrow strait or chokehold in order to disrupt sea lines of communication. Such international agreements as the Container Security Initiatives (CSI), the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have been implemented to increase maritime security, but they are still rather blunt tools.

 

Besides killing innocent workers, attacks on gas and oil platforms (GOPLATs) can cause
great damage to the economy and the environment. (Photo: U.S. Navy.)

Naturally, it is easier for a military vessel or facility to protect itself against terrorism; a vessel or facility has adequate tools and training and the mandate to use them. That said, combating terrorism is never easy (combat never is), especially when the opponent is willing to sacrifice his life for the cause. Most military strategies and tactics are based on the fact that sane enemy combatants would like to avoid being killed or injured; therefore, most strategies and tactics are ineffective against a suicide bomber.

The most effective countermeasures to suicide attacks are physical distance from the object (i.e., a protection zone), physical barriers, and avoiding routinely/static behavior. The terrorist will still be able to cause damage in the face of such preventive measures, but not as intended. On the other hand, once a civilian vessel or facility is designated as a target, it is almost impossible to intervene effectively against terrorists. Hopefully, the authorities or private security companies can anticipate and prevent the incident in its infancy.

The problem, even for military units, is the fact that a threat must be detected, classified, identified, and/or documented before it can be neutralized. In the case of a waterborne IED, this is problematic: you do not want to be close enough to identify the suspect vessel, as this might put you in the killing zone of the explosion, and it is not feasible to destroy every approaching vessel prior to identification. Common protective measures include establishing a protection zone, with a radius of approximately 100 up to 500 meters around the vessel or facility (useless against long-range weapon systems), and using speedboats or helicopters to intercept approaching vessels. Protective measures could also include deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify the object as far away as possible to gain time for countermeasures.

A more controversial method is the use of less-lethal weapons, including lasers and microwaves (which cause pain by burning), acoustics (which cause pain by interfering with hearing), and net technology (which fire a projectile containing a net to entangle and catch the target). Some question whether such less-lethal weapons are reliable against suicide bombers; if no effect has been achieved, will there still be time to use traditional, deadly, but proven effective weapons to halt the threat? Another concern of less-lethal weapons is using them too hastily and casually because they most often do not kill the opponent. It is easy to skip the identification step and start using the weapon as a long-range index finger, causing unnecessary pain to innocents.
In the end, remember that the most effective defense against terrorism is an effective, resolute, and energetic intelligence service, capable of anticipating actions before they become a potential threat.

 

This picture was taken off the coast of Somalia, while the MV Golden Blessing was still under pirate control
and its crew held hostage after being hijacked on June 28, 2010. MV Golden Blessing was released on
November 6, 2010, for a ransom of $2.8 million. (Photo: Anna Norén.)

CONCLUSION

It is rather remarkable that the international community accepts piracy in the 21st century, and the fact that more than 400 incidents were reported during 2009. At this moment in late 2010, there are about 25 hijacked ships at anchor off the coast of Somalia and approximately 500 crewmembers held as hostages. Many shipping companies have accepted this phenomenon and have actually budgeted for this expense, as other alternatives entail higher economic costs or risks of losing lives. Some nations have tried using military force to free ships and hostages, with varying results, but these types of operations are simply too hazardous to be a standard solution to the problem. Another difficulty is the fact that some nations let pirates use their territorial waters to operate freely and anchor hijacked ships.

Shipping companies can avoid being boarded or hijacked by employing security details aboard vessels, but a more permanent solution to the pirate menace means soldiers on the ground. Considering the situation and conditions in pirate-prone areas, this would be a costly undertaking, both financially and in terms of human lives.

Maritime terrorism is a related issue that requires ongoing vigilance and a coordinated international effort to monitor, analyze, and prevent. With the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the world has been made painfully aware of the consequences of an accident aboard an offshore oil-drilling platform, and it does not take a lot of imagination to visualize the results of a well-planned terrorist attack against such a facility. Hopefully, it does not require a maritime 9/11 to get the world to wake up and recognize the clear and present danger that maritime terrorism poses.